Collins or De Valera

[his holiness nb]

Context is everything, so your tactic is not just meaningless, it is positively misleading. This suggests to me that you are unable to find fault with my basic thesis.

My tactic??? 

f**k sake EG stop trying to pick rows, I was paying you a compliment.

I disagree fully with your "basic thesis" but didnt even say so, as I simply dont have the time to get into it.
So instead of argueing with your post, I merely posted a compliment at how well you put your argument forth.

Relax a bit more EG, sometimes you should just take a compliment as exactly that, stop trying to pick meanings and motives behind them.

[Evil Genius]

Context is everything, so your tactic is not just meaningless, it is positively misleading. This suggests to me that you are unable to find fault with my basic thesis.

My tactic??? 

f**k sake EG stop trying to pick rows, I was paying you a compliment.

I disagree fully with your "basic thesis" but didnt even say so, as I simply dont have the time to get into it.
So instead of argueing with your post, I merely posted a compliment at how well you put your argument forth.

Relax a bit more EG, sometimes you should just take a compliment as exactly that, stop trying to pick meanings and motives behind them.

Yep, tactic is the word. You "damn my posts with faint praise" by appearing to pay a compliment, when your real point is to be found in the accompanying barb - in this case, a distortion in the form of a line taken entirely out of context. Moreover, your intervention often occurs when I am debating some point with others, on topics where you have little or no contribution to make to the overall discussion.

It's for all the world like seeing two or three dogs in a fight in the park, and one yappy wee mutt comes in, takes a quick nip at one of the protagonists and runs away before anyone can get a hold of him. He then sits wagging his tail on the sideline, proud of what a brave* little doggie he really is.

Oh and btw, I am not unrelaxed about this, though its predictability makes it irritating.

* - Or in your case, what a brave and broad-minded doggie i.e. bites and compliments...

[magpie seanie]

EG - its seems I underestimated you or maybe didn't pay enough attention to some of the stuff you have put up here. Some excellent posts on this thread. I had you written aff as a dogmatic, "not an incher" but it seems I may have been too hasty.

I don't necessarily agree with you completely but its a fairly solid argument. And even though I like HHNB I really liked this bit:

You "damn my posts with faint praise"

[his holiness nb]

It's for all the world like seeing two or three dogs in a fight in the park, and one yappy wee mutt comes in, takes a quick nip at one of the protagonists and runs away before anyone can get a hold of him. He then sits wagging his tail on the sideline, proud of what a brave* little doggie he really is.
Oh and btw, I am not unrelaxed about this, though its predictability makes it irritating.

EG, I complimented your writing skills. You made an argument and I complimented how it was put together. I dont have to agree with what you say to state how well constructed a post is. The point that I disagree with the post but you "nearly had me beleiving it" should be a testament to how well I think its written.
I dont need to agree with your argument to say its very well written.

But you go on the defensive and start this personal shite again my comparing me to a "yappy wee mutt" 

The "damning my post with faint praise" statement reeks of paranoia. If I wanted to damn your post I would have went to the trouble of pointing out what exactly I thought was wrong about it. I didnt, as I had no intentions of getting dragged into another row (ironic eh) I merely praised how you put the post together.

If you dont want to accept the compliment dont, just keep the personal shite out of it.

[Evil Genius]

If I wanted to damn your post I would have went to the trouble of pointing out what exactly I thought was wrong about it.

Go on then. Remember, I condensed my case to a simple enough question, when I posted:
"Or do you disagree that after the Rising, the Unionists in Ulster were never going to be persuaded to throw their lot in with their Nationalist fellow-Irishmen on any terms, now that those Nationalists had now embraced the extreme, violent ideals (Pearse's "blood sacrifice" etc) of the new Republican leadership?"

I didnt, as I had no intentions of getting dragged into another row (ironic eh)

Ah, I see. You don't want to get "dragged in", then? Strange, because previously your excuse for not engaging in debate was lack of time - this from a man who has three and a half thousand posts on this Board...

P.S. For an example of how to pay compliments sincerely, see Magpie Seanie's post (above) [Thanks for that, btw, Magpie]

[Jim_Murphy_74]

I don't think anyone can predict what would have happened had there been no War of Independence. But I see that War as being a classic example of the old Irish witticism where the American Tourist asks a local for directions to somewhere, only to meet the reply: "If I were you, I wouldn't start from here..."
That is, the key factor in determining Ireland's future was the Easter Rising. Before then, it seems clear that the British Government were going to honour their pledge of Home Rule, in some form or other. Of course, Ulster was going to be a problem, but Lloyd George was such a canny politician I feel he would have found some way of "finessing" the situation.
However, the Rising so inflamed feelings in every quarter, that a negotiated settlement on pre-WWI terms was now impossible.
In which case, Lloyd George had to deal with the situation in hand i.e. he couldn't start again from "somewhere else". That being so, he ultimately delivered a Settlement (the Treaty) which, from the British point of view, was the best achievable combination of principle and pragmatism.
Principle was served by the fact that of the three warring factions - pro-Treaty, anti-Treaty and Ulster Unionists - the anti-Treaty forces were the least powerful, so facing them down would be the least bloody outcome (there being no peaceful option available after the Rising).
And Pragmatism was served by the fact that if he denied Home Rule entirely, the escalating bloodshed would still have been Britain's responsibility, whereas if he had granted HR to all of Ireland, he would likely have had to face down the Ulster Unionists (whose Loyalty and Sacrifice during the Great War boosted their general popularity throughout GB).
Whereas, by implementing Partition, the bloodshed which was likely to arise (Civil War) would be the Free State's responsibility, not Britain's.
Further proof of this pragmatism and political ability of LG is to be found in the fact that Stormont was not originally intended to be a permanent "solution" to the Ulster question. As much as anything else, it was intended to secure Ulster's compliance with the Treaty "solution" and keep them out of any conflict, at least for the time being. Of course, Stormont soon became became a permanent fixture, but it is not coincidental that the Parliament Buldings which evenyually embodied that permanence were not actually opened until 1932 - 11 years on from the Treaty.

Therefore, from this Irish Unionist's perspective, regardless of who one considers to have been the "hero" of 1921, in my eyes, the clear "Villain" was De Valera, not for what he did in the Civil War, but for his part in the Rising.
And fwiw, whilst I know this will receive the shortest of shrift amongst Nationalists/Republicans today, I feel anyone who desires a truly United Ireland should reject Dev and the other leaders of the Rising even more firmly, since that event turned out to be the seminal event in hardening attitudes (unnecessarily, I might add) on every front (Ulster, Ireland, Britain), so that whatever else, there was never going to be a united Ireland in the lifetime of anyone who was around in 1916.

P.S. As for Solomon's conjecture (above), I don't necessarily agree or disagree with it, but would take the strongest issue with one point. Namely, a modern day "Flight of the Unionists" (to Canada or Australia etc) was never going to happen. After 300 years when many of their ancestors had forged on to the Americas, Australasia and beyond, those who were still left by 1921 weren't going anywhere. (And they still aren't, 400 years later!)
 

Some solid points there EG.  On the War of Independence my reading indicates that the "Northern Question" was not a contributory factor for any of the protagonists.  The belief that it was a temporary and pragmatic step was held by all parties. 

However I never fully understand the British inisistance on the Oath of Allegiance and resistance to a republic.  Once could argue that the Irish were foolish to go to war over items that were in many ways intangible but what of the British motives on this issue?

The British attitude from the first Dáil session to the Solohead ambush was highly belligerent, pushing the Provisional Government towards war. (possibly to call their bluff?)  It was during this period that Churchhill pointed out that the British Government were charged with maintaining, not dismantling the empire and that no negotiations about sovereignty could be entertained.

I am more inclined to think that Llyod George was pitting the DeValera and Collins camps against each other in the hope of new state collapsing to such anarchy that all bets would be off.  He may have underestimated Collins drive to end the violence.   

/Jim.

[his holiness nb]

Ah, I see. You don't want to get "dragged in", then? Strange, because previously your excuse for not engaging in debate was lack of time - this from a man who has three and a half thousand posts on this Board...

So the fact that I spent nearly all day every day on here a year or two ago in a boring job gives you reason to dictate to me that I have time to do it now in totally different circumstances ?  

P.S. For an example of how to pay compliments sincerely, see Magpie Seanie's post (above) [Thanks for that, btw, Magpie]

Apolgies if my compliment wasnt enough for you EG  

f**k sake, its 100% simple, I paid you a compliment and you react with personal insults and try to goad me into debate.

I've come to expect personal insults from you, its the norm, and dont get me wrong I've returned them too.

But you were out of order on this occasion and totally misread a genuine compliment made in good faith.

If you dont have the good grace to accept the compliment, faint or not, then thats fine. No need to retaliate with insults though.

[magpie seanie]

EG- I just read down your initial post on this thread and I think you are harsh on the leaders of the rising. From their perspective there was no real evidence that their cause had advanced at all. There had been promises on Home Rule many times before only for it to be thwarted and all shades of green in the republican movement of the day were frustrated. They had seen how unionists had won concessions by taking up arms and would have had no confidence in any British government standing up to unionism or even, as you succinctly put in - "finessing the situation". As you mention also the fact that vast hordes of Ulster unionists were fighting and giving their lives for King and country would greatly strengthen their hand dealing with govenrment after the war.

So I think the leaders of the Rising felt they had no option. If they waited the political landscape looked to be going away from them yet again as the prize was about to be given out. The Rising was bourne out of this frustration and it was militarily a complete failure. The brutal execution of the leaders was the own goal that made something out of the Rising. This action alone would severly whether there was any sympathy or understading of Irish matters at all at the highest level at that time. This is the crucial point of your argument and while I agree Lloyd George was skilled it is far from clear that he would have worked for a settlement such as you see. When he became prime minister he relied on unionist support in parliament.

So all in all you made some excellent points but we disagree on key elements. Yes - the Rising was the key event but I wouldn't castigate the leaders as I think the peaceful outcome you outline was at best unlikely.

[lynchbhoy]

EG- I just read down your initial post on this thread and I think you are harsh on the leaders of the rising. From their perspective there was no real evidence that their cause had advanced at all. There had been promises on Home Rule many times before only for it to be thwarted and all shades of green in the republican movement of the day were frustrated. They had seen how unionists had won concessions by taking up arms and would have had no confidence in any British government standing up to unionism or even, as you succinctly put in - "finessing the situation". As you mention also the fact that vast hordes of Ulster unionists were fighting and giving their lives for King and country would greatly strengthen their hand dealing with govenrment after the war.

no one would know what would have hapened but I would agree with Magpie Seanie.
But one thing, lloyd george did not have any loyalty to any Irish person who fought inthe war - ulster prod or southern Cath , george even then relied on thepolitical voting block of ulster unionists voting for his gov and its policies in westminister - a tactic employed up until a few years ago by the conservatives. That was his motivation. As we know the english politicians dont care less about our country.

[his holiness nb]

EG- I just read down your initial post on this thread and I think you are harsh on the leaders of the rising. From their perspective there was no real evidence that their cause had advanced at all. There had been promises on Home Rule many times before only for it to be thwarted and all shades of green in the republican movement of the day were frustrated. They had seen how unionists had won concessions by taking up arms and would have had no confidence in any British government standing up to unionism or even, as you succinctly put in - "finessing the situation". As you mention also the fact that vast hordes of Ulster unionists were fighting and giving their lives for King and country would greatly strengthen their hand dealing with govenrment after the war.

So I think the leaders of the Rising felt they had no option. If they waited the political landscape looked to be going away from them yet again as the prize was about to be given out. The Rising was bourne out of this frustration and it was militarily a complete failure. The brutal execution of the leaders was the own goal that made something out of the Rising. This action alone would severly whether there was any sympathy or understading of Irish matters at all at the highest level at that time. This is the crucial point of your argument and while I agree Lloyd George was skilled it is far from clear that he would have worked for a settlement such as you see. When he became prime minister he relied on unionist support in parliament.

So all in all you made some excellent points but we disagree on key elements. Yes - the Rising was the key event but I wouldn't castigate the leaders as I think the peaceful outcome you outline was at best unlikely.

Pretty much spot on imo Magpie, well put.

*note this is not a compliment and should not be treated as such*

[Evil Genius]

Some solid points there EG. 

Thank you.

On the War of Independence my reading indicates that the "Northern Question" was not a contributory factor for any of the protagonists.

I expect that to be the case. Sadly, by the time brother falls out with brother, they're usually both long past worrying what the neighbours will think.

The belief that it was a temporary and pragmatic step was held by all parties. 

By "it", I take it you mean the Civil War, rather than Partition?

However I never fully understand the British inisistance on the Oath of Allegiance and resistance to a republic.  Once could argue that the Irish were foolish to go to war over items that were in many ways intangible but what of the British motives on this issue?

I'd say this stems from a whole host of factors. First and foremost, you must not underestimate the then loyalty of the average British subject to the Monarchy. Remember, when millions joined up in WWI, they were doing so "For King and Country". The fact that they endured 3/4 of a million deaths, plus unquantifiably more injury and suffering, without ever seriously questioning the cause is overwhelming testimony to that. This wiill have been especially keenly felt in the Irish context, since Britain's sense of betrayal at the 1916 Rising - when Britain's very existence was in peril from a much greater enemy- will have been very bitterly felt.
Second, they had an enormous Empire to maintain, so didn't want "dangerous" ideas such as Republicanism and Independence to take root generally. Which is not to say they were entirely rigid in demanding strict Imperial status. For example, they were happy enough (albeit on essentially racial grounds) to grant Dominion status to Australia, NZ and Canada. And if it was good enough for them...
And despite the anti-British sentiment in Ireland at the time, hostility to the Monarch himself was by no means universally implacable even amongst the Nationalist population, never mind the Ulster Unionists, for whom the Oath etc for all of Ireland will have been a reassurance.
And it was only 16 years since Arthur Griffiths, no less, proposed a co-Monarchy for Britain and Ireland (after the fashion of Austria and Hungary), or 5 years since so many of Redmond's Irish Volunteers had died in Flanders in the King's Colours.
Besides, it would be a mistake to believe that the British were all as one with their demands. Lloyd George's great skills included being able to manage a Coalition Government, where the Conservatives, with their own Agenda, were latterly in the majority. What may have been seen by him as being essentially symbolic, might have been a useful bone to throw to the more hardline Imperialists in his camp?
As you can see, without the benefit of Cabinet Minutes etc, I'm largely guessing(!), but I'm sure an element of face-saving will also have featured, i.e. "The Irish might have won the fight to break away, but the Settlement will still be on our terms"

The British attitude from the first Dáil session to the Solohead ambush was highly belligerent, pushing the Provisional Government towards war. (possibly to call their bluff?) 

Indeed. But without meaning to excuse the excesses of the Black & Tans etc, this level of "belligerence" is all relative. Never mind the ruthlessness brought to bear on the German enemy in the Great War, the effort deployed to crush rebellion elsewhere e.g. in South Africa, Sudan, India etc was on an infinitely greater scale than seen in Ireland. There will undoubtedly have been a faction in the British Establishment which will have wondered: "Why can't we just send the Army in to put these truculent Paddies down and have done with it?"
And Bluff will also have been an element.

It was during this period that Churchhill pointed out that the British Government were charged with maintaining, not dismantling the empire and that no negotiations about sovereignty could be entertained.

Churchill led one of those factions which Lloyd George had to manage. And as it happens, he had a curiously contradictory attitude in this respect. Unlike his father Randolph, who was the Ulster Unionists' greatest ally in previous decades, he had little time for Ireland. But he was passionately concerned to retain the rest of the Empire, especially India. So it wasn't necessarily the Irish themselves whom he had in mind when taking such a hard line on sovereignty etc.
Besides, having been directly involved in the Boer Wars, he will have noted that South Africa still retained its Dominion Status, despite the Boers being as strong an enemy, and as anti-British, as the Irish Nationalists ever were.

I am more inclined to think that Llyod George was pitting the DeValera and Collins camps against each other in the hope of new state collapsing to such anarchy that all bets would be off.  He may have underestimated Collins drive to end the violence.   

LG was certainly never averse to such hard negotiating tactics! The terms which he imposed on the defeated Germans, after his great triumph of having led the country to victory, were entirely ruthless. But this same ruthless pragmatism will also have caused him to appreciate that had complete Anarchy ensued, it would have been left to Britain to pick up the pieces, with no hope of ever putting them back together again to anything resembling a solution.
By 1921, he knew and accepted that Nationalist Ireland was "lost", the only question remaining will have been how best to make the break. As for the ability (or otherwise) of Collins to sort it out, I'd say LG was just happy enough that it would be out of his own hands to do so.

[Evil Genius]

EG- I just read down your initial post on this thread and I think you are harsh on the leaders of the rising. From their perspective there was no real evidence that their cause had advanced at all.

No doubt that this was how they saw things from their perspective. But I still believe that that perspective was so narrow, indeed fanatical, as to have been misconceived. And even if their suspicions of Britain's true commitment to Home Rule were correct, they ought to have known that to attempt a Rising at that time, can only have served to harden attitudes amongst the British.
Which, of course might still have been OK, so long as you believe that the ends justify the means. But their attempt at a military coup was always doomed to failure. The fact is that they "got lucky" (sorry, offensive, I know) when the British decided to execute the Leaders, thereby turning pitiable defeat into eventual "victory". But never forget that such a transformation was never within their gift to deliver to their supporters.

There had been promises on Home Rule many times before only for it to be thwarted and all shades of green in the republican movement of the day were frustrated. They had seen how unionists had won concessions by taking up arms and would have had no confidence in any British government standing up to unionism or even, as you succinctly put in - "finessing the situation". As you mention also the fact that vast hordes of Ulster unionists were fighting and giving their lives for King and country would greatly strengthen their hand dealing with govenrment after the war.

You might be right in your analysis - we'll never know. But i would point out that up until 1916, the clear majority of Irish Nationalists did not share the Rebels' mistrust of the British. Indeed, for all that is made of the undoubted sacrifices of the Rebels, their supporters overlook the (arguably greater) sacrifice of Redmond's Irish Volunteers. That is, those Irish people trusted the British sufficiently to risk their own lives, in advance of the delivery of Home Rule. They can't all have been entirely naive, surely?
I've no doubt the Rebels didn't just waken up some morning and conclude the British were suddenly going to betray them, for no particular reason. But once more, they made the classic mistake of failing to see things from their opponents' perspective. Of course, they saw the apparent success of Carson's Volunteers in facing down the British, by force of arms. But how desperate do you think the Ulster Volunteers were, if they were prepared to go to war with their own "kith and kin"? Their trust in the British Government in 1912 was even less than most Nationalists by 1916.
Of course, the Rebels will have been persuaded that the Unionists had "won" in 1912, but if the Unionists had regained ground then, the struggle over Home Rule was a long way short of being a "done deal" by Easter 1916 (imo).
And don't forget that the great sacrifice of the Ulstermen at the Somme, which so advanced their cause with the British Government, occurred in July 1916 - months after the Easter Rising.

So I think the leaders of the Rising felt they had no option. If they waited the political landscape looked to be going away from them yet again as the prize was about to be given out.

Clearly. But neither that, nor their undoubted courage, means they were correct.

The Rising was bourne out of this frustration and it was militarily a complete failure. The brutal execution of the leaders was the own goal that made something out of the Rising. This action alone would severly whether there was any sympathy or understading of Irish matters at all at the highest level at that time. This is the crucial point of your argument and while I agree Lloyd George was skilled it is far from clear that he would have worked for a settlement such as you see. When he became prime minister he relied on unionist support in parliament.

But can't you see that just as the execution of the rebels greatly hardened, even transformed, the views of Irish Nationalists, the action of the Rebels in "stabbing Britain in the back" at their most perillous hour must have hardened attitudes amongst the British? This will have been especially if the British really had  been sincere in their commitment to Home Rule i.e. "We gave them our word and this is how they repay us. Well, we won't make that mistake again"

So all in all you made some excellent points but we disagree on key elements. Yes - the Rising was the key event but I wouldn't castigate the leaders as I think the peaceful outcome you outline was at best unlikely.

I did not intend to give the impression that had there been no Rising, then we would have had an entirely peaceful outcome. However, it seems unavoidable to conclude that such was the effect of the Rising in raising the temperature for everyone involved (and the British contributed in no small measure by the brutality of their response to it), that whatever hopes there were of a tolerably peaceable outcome before 1916, were all but in shreds after it.
And as far as I'm concerned, for a small, unelected and unrepresentative band of people to take it upon themselves to crush those hopes irreversibly, is unforgiveable.

And in any case, even those who disagree with the above analysis of the Rebels' motives and principles etc, must, with the benefit of hindsight, agree that their actions in striking as they did, actually did nothing to advance the cause of a truly "united" Ireland, since it so alienated that 25% of the Irish population who called themselves "Unionists".

[Evil Genius]

But one thing, lloyd george did not have any loyalty to any Irish person who fought inthe war - ulster prod or southern Cath , george even then relied on thepolitical voting block of ulster unionists voting for his gov and its policies in westminister - a tactic employed up until a few years ago by the conservatives. That was his motivation. As we know the english politicians dont care less about our country.

What you fail to comprehend is that at the start of the 20th Century, many of those politicians would not have characterised themselves as "English", but rather as "British". In which case, they would also not have seen Ireland as "your" country, they would have seen it as part of their own country (whether you agree with them or not).
After all, not only was Lloyd George no Englishman, but English wasn't even his first language.

Still, how would a Welshman understand what it's like to live under the yoke of an oppressive neighbour...

[Son_of_Sam]

But one thing, lloyd george did not have any loyalty to any Irish person who fought inthe war - ulster prod or southern Cath , george even then relied on thepolitical voting block of ulster unionists voting for his gov and its policies in westminister - a tactic employed up until a few years ago by the conservatives. That was his motivation. As we know the english politicians dont care less about our country.

What you fail to comprehend is that at the start of the 20th Century, many of those politicians would not have characterised themselves as "English", but rather as "British". In which case, they would also not have seen Ireland as "your" country, they would have seen it as part of their own country (whether you agree with them or not).
After all, not only was Lloyd George no Englishman, but English wasn't even his first language.

Still, how would a Welshman understand what it's like to live under the yoke of an oppressive neighbour...

An Uncle Tom if I ever saw one.

I must sayEG while I don't agree with alot of what you just said, it was well thought out & thats what is really needed in this world, so while your on here, who do you reckon will win Sam or McCarthy? 

[ONeill]

There is no doubt that the Rising was an absolute shambles, typifying historical Irish rebellions before that, and EG is correct when he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit of rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders. The British always seemed to make such errors, that bullish retribution and flexing of muscle has been their downfall in almost every patch of land they encroached upon. Collins' sister managed to get a word with Michael as they marched beaten from the GPO and his only answer was 'a fuckin disaster'.

I'd love to have been a fly on the wall in the three private meetings Dev had with Lloyd George before he sent Collins over. Dev's decision to 'stay with his people' really held little weight and history does seem to point us in the direction of passing the buck. However, did Collins receive a 'warning' in terms of buying more time to consult with Dev. I don't buy into that Collins wouldn't have been easily bluffed nor bullied by the British. Perhaps Collins' ego was his own downfall.