Missing Plane!!

[muppet]

I believe that recommendation was issued in 2002. That particular aircraft may have been constructed as late as 2005 (according to Pprune). If that were true then Airbus would also have failed to follow it's own recommendation.

This could turn into a nightmare for the French Government with Airbus going to war against Air France.

All three would probably like to see a 'Pilot error' finding.

[orangeman]

I believe that recommendation was issued in 2002. That particular aircraft may have been constructed as late as 2005 (according to Pprune). If that were true then Airbus would also have failed to follow it's own recommendation.

This could turn into a nightmare for the French Government with Airbus going to war against Air France.

All three would probably like to see a 'Pilot error' finding.

That's guaranteed at this stage - even if they found traces of explosives they'd say it came from the second world war !!

[orangeman]

Air France terror link

Two passengers on board the doomed flight had names that appeared on a classified list of radical Muslims
By Jonathan HarwoodFIRST POSTED JUNE 10, 2009The names of two passengers on the doomed Air France flight AF447 which crashed into the Atlantic last week appeared on classified French documents listing radical Muslims considered to be a threat, raising the spectre that terrorists may have been involved in the disaster that killed 228 people.

The discovery was made by a team from the Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE) - the French equivalent of MI6 - sent to South America to go through the list of those who boarded the Airbus 330 in Rio de Janeiro on Sunday, May 31.

Agents are trying to establish dates of birth and family connections of the two passengers to see if they are the same people listed in the documents. A security service source told the French media that while there was a possibility the name similarities were a "macabre coincidence",
they were being "taken very seriously".

Despite the finding, Air France maintains that "all the indications" are that the Airbus suffered some kind of catastrophic equipment failure. Investigators are focusing on the plane's airspeed sensors which were giving faulty readings, according to automatic data alerts sent by the plane during its final minutes in the air.

A total of 41 bodies have so far been recovered from the crash zone 700 miles off Brazil's north-east coast. The plane's tail fin has also been recovered - an important discovery as it could narrow the underwater search for the 'black box' flight recorders. A French nuclear submarine and a naval vessel containing robot submarines are expected to reach the crash site this week and begin searching the ocean bed for the two recorders.

Meanwhile, a memorial service is to be held at Trinity College, Dublin for the three Irish doctors killed in the crash. Eithne Walls, 28, from Ballygowan, County Down, died along with her friends Aisling Butler, from Roscrea, County Tipperary, and Jane Deasy from Dublin. 

[Treasurer]

There was a mass for Aisling Butler on Tues evening - never saw crowds like it.  They were spilling out into the yard a good half hour before the Mass started- and it's a very big Church.  The Mass ended just after 9 and the crowd queuing to sympathise was still out the door at half 10.  RIP

[full back]

Irony at its worst 

http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/2009/06/11/w oman-who-missed-air-france-crash-killed-in-car-accident-8690 8-21432567/

[Gabriel_Hurl]

Real life Final Destination 

[full back]

Real life Final Destination 

Just what I was thinking Gab

[clarshack]

Real life Final Destination 

Just what I was thinking Gab

the plane in final destination was also supposed to go to paris.

[tyssam5]

This seems to be a credible analysis of the weather that was on the route that the Air France flew into. It is quite scientific in nature so if, like me, you don't have a degree in meteorology a lot of it will go over your head. But it is very interesting without ever being sensationalist. It is where I got the charts I posted earlier.

http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/

There could be a number of reasons why they flew into that weather but none would seem logical to us after the event. The A330 has two engines and is limited by what is called ETOPS. Looking at the chart it seems simple to say they should have planned a route further west and pass to the northwest of the weather but the ETOPS restrictions (needing to stay within 180 minutes of an airport) may have forced them to use that route. (Note this is my own speculation and it should be treated as such, I have no evidence to support this this).

This chart from the above site is very interesting:



As they approached the first storm they may not have seen the second much bigger one on the radar. This is a phenomenon of aircraft weather radars that basically when it shows you a storm you can't rely on the information it gives 'behind' the storm. No one knows yet if they manoeuvred around the first one or flew straight through it but either way the second storm system might have be thrust upon them fairly quickly. They might not have had any idea of the extent of it until they had passed the first one. In that case it is a choice of using the radar to pick a route through the weather that shows the least 'returns' or else going around it. It may have seemed too late at that stage to go around it.

Thanks for the analysis Muppet. I clicked on your ETOPS link and read the following:

In 1988, the FAA amended the ETOPS regulation to allow the extension to a 180-minute diversion period subject to stringent technical and operational qualifications. This made 95% of the Earth's surface available to ETOPS flights.

So it wouldn't seem likely from reading about 95% that any part of the South Atlantic would be outside of a 180 min exclusion zone, map of that should be available though? What about fuel, what is the route length vs. operating range, could this make a diversion less likely. Also I'm not sure about Air France, but I've read about pilots coming under pressure not to avoid turbulence as much anymore due to fuel costs?

[muppet]

tyssam5 Air France has very strong unions. I would be confident that any crew that had to land en route (e.g. in the Canaries) after burning fuel to go around severe weather, would have no problems with their employer.

The ETOPS 5% of the earth mentioned would be in the north and south Pacific, north and south Atlantic and possibly Antarctica (don't know enough about it). Also that article assumes that aircraft are certified for the full 180 minutes. Unserviceable equipment can downgrade the ETOPS certification and if that was the case for the Air France, they could have had to plan a route for e.g. 120 minutes ETOPS.

As I said though that was a suggestion of mine and I still haven't heard any basis to suggest ETOPS might have been a factor.

All the industry talk at the moment is focusing on the pitot probes and the possibility that a fault meant they couldn't cope with severe icing.

Severe icing is just one possible adverse affects of 56,000 foot high CBs (thunderstorms). Why someone would knowingly fly a passenger aircraft into one is beyond me.     

[Aerlik]

Severe icing is just one possible adverse affects of 56,000 foot high CBs (thunderstorms). Why someone would knowingly fly a passenger aircraft into one is beyond me.     

Another adverse effect is high likelihood of being smacked with hailstones the size of bowling balls.  I had the pleasure of experiencing icing at 9000ft on my way into Perth one night several years ago.  Talk about a rapid descent.  Luckily I had no pax on board.  Just got her down and dealt with ATC afterwards.  No problems.

I'm still going on the depressurisation theory leading to pilot incapacitation.  (Why were there automatic signals given indicating malfunctions yet no mention of this during any radio contact with ATC, as the pilots would have also been alerted I should imagine?)  In turn the plane would not have slowed down as it entered the severe turbulence and the physical parameters of the aircraft exceeded.

[muppet]

Severe icing is just one possible adverse affects of 56,000 foot high CBs (thunderstorms). Why someone would knowingly fly a passenger aircraft into one is beyond me.     

Another adverse effect is high likelihood of being smacked with hailstones the size of bowling balls.  I had the pleasure of experiencing icing at 9000ft on my way into Perth one night several years ago.  Talk about a rapid descent.  Luckily I had no pax on board.  Just got her down and dealt with ATC afterwards.  No problems.

I'm still going on the depressurisation theory leading to pilot incapacitation.  (Why were there automatic signals given indicating malfunctions yet no mention of this during any radio contact with ATC, as the pilots would have also been alerted I should imagine?)  In turn the plane would not have slowed down as it entered the severe turbulence and the physical parameters of the aircraft exceeded.

There was one ACARS message sent manually by the crew reporting turbulence not long before the automatic messages.

Here is a well presented analysis I found online but it comes with the usual disclaimers.

http://luckybogey.wordpress.com/2009/06/12/af-flight-447-we-face-a-puzzle/


The Three (3) Phases up to the "Event."  (See Previous Post)

You have:

1. Normal phase

A. Transition into trouble phase

2. Trouble phase

B. Transition to outcome

3. Outcome...

Outcome can be "problem solved", "problem remained but safe outcome", "survivable accident", and "insurvivable accident".

There are cases where phases can repeat itself, although it is I believe, rare... often, the transitions overlap into the phases, but normally does not extend beyond 2 phases or a phase and the following transition (in cases of multiple phases, that is). Terrorist bombing of aircraft is unique because it overlaps A, 2 and B into one.

The facts that we have remain on the phases (normal flight, phase2 began in 0210, and phase 3 is that we're now finding bodies and aircraft pieces), and nothing in the transitions.

Phasing does ease discussions and investigations in a LOT of accidents and incidents. I must stress however, that the root cause can be before Phase 1... however, that is for the investigators... when causes start way before Phase 1, it requires data not available to the public domain.

I do wish that we discuss it in a systematic manner, such as the division into phases as above. It will make things much easier. So, where are we now?

We know that the ACARS messages point towards problems with the pitot static system. This is not definite, albeit likely. As many professionals have stated, these messages can only explain what may have happened. This is Phase 2.

We know that pieces of the aircraft/bodies are found and so have bodies. Phase 3 is therefore an accident. We do not know whether it is a survivable accident, or an insurvivable one. It is safe however, to assume that this is an insurvivable accident based on the information available.

So, this leaves the transitions... A and B.

Transition A has a few possibilities.

A1. Loss of reliable airspeed data. This explains some of the ACARS messages. This however, if the procedures are carried out promptly, should not have caused in loss of aircraft.

A2. Loss of all Air Data... This explains further the ACARS messages. Procedures following this extends beyond that of A1, and can (not does) explain the cabin pressure controller ACARS message as it is part of the QRH/ECAM action... amongst other things.

A3. Total loss of all ADIRU... This means loss of Air Data and Attitude Reference data. This, is extremely unlikely to happen. If someone can explain why TCAS was in the ACARS message then we can theorize objectively whether this was a likely scenario or not.

A4. Bomb. Only a small explosion can explain what then happened in phase 2, albeit in my opinion, explains less when in comparison with A1, A2 and A3.

A5. Lightning strike. It is unlikely to have affected a transition into phase 2, based on data for phase 2.

A6. Tailfin separation. It is unlikely to have affected a transition into phase 2, based on the data for phase 2.

A7. Excessive turbulence resulting in attitude upset. This has been deemed unlikely due to data supporting A1 and A2. Should this have happened, A1 and/or A2 and/or A3 is unlikely to have continued after aircraft recovered normal attitude.

A8. Pilots switching off the autopilot and autothrust. Whilst switching off autothrust is an option to the crew as part of the QRH for severe turbulence encounter, human action to switch off the autopilot and auto thrust does not produce an ACARS maintenance message. This is therefore deemed as unlikely.

Note that A1 – A8 only goes to explain what may have caused entry to phase 2. Possible causes for the transition to happen, will be discussed below.

How about Transition B?

B1. Bomb, if in transition B, cannot be dismissed based on current info.

B2. Lightning strike, this is possible due to lack of ACARS messages from the aircraft after 0214UTC which can mean electrical failure. This can explain further resulting failures as per B3 and B4.

B3. Electrical failure. See above and B5.

B4. Further loss of ADR or IR. This is possible.

B5. Wing separation. This can explain the lack of ACARS messages after 0214UTC due to lack of AC power based on engine electrical generators being severed from the fuselage (see B3).

B6. Loss of control. This is possible due to the flight control laws degrading to alternate or alternate 2 in bad weather. However, it is deemed unlikely that transition B is simply explained by crew inability to maintain control. Loss of control coupled with B3 and/or B5 is possible as with B3, aircraft would further degrade to direct law, and with B4, loss of attitude information in the dark.

B7. Tailfin separation. This is possible if after 0214UTC but require B6 as prerequisite(s).

B8. Airframe disintegration. This is possible with B6 as prerequisite.

B9. Crew task saturation. This is possible as in previous incidents, crew involved has cited overwhelming ECAM messages as a likely hindrance to prompt action to rescue the situation. This can easily explain B6, and subsequent possibilities.

Please note that anything in transition B would mean it is not a single failure, as it requires transition A. So before jumping to simplistic conclusions, bear that in mind.

Also note that B1 – 9 is a collection of what may have happened and what may have caused entry to phase 3 (different rules apply to phase 3). Any causes cited in phase 3 cannot be used as root cause, as it is "subsequent cause arising from the occurence of previous causes".

I do hope that reading this, one would realize that anything is possible for transition B.  So, if we want to discuss what may have caused transition A to happen, we will be discussing probable causes... which if we catalogue it.

O.1. Excessive Icing: This is possible and explains A1 and A2, and subsequently possibly explain several items in transition B. Icing is also hard to pick up on radar (if not impossible).

O.2. Radar insensitivity: No failure information was sent by the ACARS, however, manipulation of gain control do pose a risk of the colors produced in the displays depicting water precipitation no longer representative of the normal calibrated values.

Radar attenuation in areas of heavy precipitation (where water sticks to the radome surface) is known to have resulted in poor ability for radar to detect clouds. The same applies for extremely dense precipitation may result in radar waves not reflecting back to the antennae but is instead "absorbed", resulting in no radar return for that particular location. This possibility can lead to O.1. above.

O.3. Lightning strike. Some may ask why this is again listed here. A lightning strike on the radome can cause damage not apparent to the ear (subtle increase in aerodynamic noise) or eyes. The damage, can lead to O.2, however this is deemed unlikely because of the lack in (voice/crew) communication.

If I am to bet... my bets will be: O.1/O.2, A.2. and B.5. leading to B.7.

*** DISCLAIMER:  ABOVE IS PERSONAL OPINION/THEORY/CONJECTURE ***

[Tyrones own]

Received this email this morning... first thoughts when reading it I have to say was that the man interviewed
was possibly on Boeings payroll
Interesting none the less!

    Air France Accident: Smoking Gun Found

    >
    >A Brazilian Naval unit reportedly found the complete vertical
    >fin/rudder assembly of the doomed aircraft floating some 30 miles
    >from the main debris field. The search for the flight recorders goes
    >on, but given the failure history of the vertical fins on
    >A300-series aircraft, an analysis of its structure at the point of
    >failure will likely yield the primary cause factor in the breakup of
    >the aircraft, with the flight recorder data (if found) providing
    >only secondary contributing phenomena.
    >
    >The fin-failure-leading-to-breakup sequence is strongly suggested in
    >the attached (below) narrative report by George Larson, Editor
    >emeritus of Smithsonian Air & Space Magazine.
    >
    >It's regrettable that these aircraft are permitted to continue in
    >routi ne flight operations with this known structural defect. It
    >appears that safety finishes last within Airbus Industries, behind
    >national pride and economics.  Hopefully, this accident will force
    >the issue to be addressed, requiring at a minimum restricted
    >operations of selected platforms, and grounding of some high-time
    >aircraft until a re-engineered (strengthened) vertical fin/rudder
    >attachment structure can be incorporated.
    >
    >Les
    >
    >--------------------------(George Larson's Report)---------------------
    >
    >This is an account of a discussion I had recently with a maintenance
    >professional
    >who salvages airliner airframes for a living. He has been at it for
    >a while, dba BMI
    >Salvage at Opa Locka Airport in Florida. In the process of stripping
    >parts, he sees
    >things few others are able to see.  His observations confirm prior
    >assessments of
    >Airbus structural deficiencies within our flight test and aero
    >structures communities
    >by those who have seen the closely held reports of A3XX-series
    >vertical fin failures.
    >
    >His observations:
    >
    >"I  have scrapped just about every type of transport aircraft from A-310,
    >A-320, B-747, 727, 737, 707, DC-3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, MD-80, L-188, L1011
    >and various Martin, Convair and KC-97 aircraft.
    >
    >Over a hundred of them.
    >
    >Airbus products are the flimsiest and most poorly designed as far as
    >airframe structure is concerned by an almost obsession to utilize composite
    >materials.
    >
    >I have one A310 vertical fin on the premises from a demonstration I just
    >performed.  It was pathetic to see the composite structure shatter as it did,
    >something a Boeing product will not do.
    >
    >The vertical fin along with the composite hinges on rudder and elevators is
    >the worst example of structural use of composites I have ever seen and I am
    >not surprised by the current pictures of rescue crews recovering the
    >complete Vertical fin and rudder assembly at some distance from the crash
    >site.
    >
    >The Airbus line has a history of both multiple rudder losses and a vertical
    >fin and rudder separation from the airframe as was the case in NY with AA.
    >
    >As an old non-radar equipped DC4 pilot who flew through many a thunderstorm
    >in Africa along the equator, I am quite familiar with their
    >ferocity.  It is not
    >difficult to understand how such a storm might have stressed an aircraft
    >structure to failure at its weakest point, and especially so in the
    >presence of
    >instrumentation problems.
    >
    >I replied with this:
    >
    >"I'm watching very carefully the orchestration of the inquiry by French
    >officials and Airbus. I think I can smell a concerted effort to steer
    >discussion away from structural issues and onto sensors, etc.  Now Air France, at the behest of th eir pilots' union, is replacing all the air data
    >sensors on the Airbus fleet, which creates a distraction and shifts the
    >media's focus away from the real problem.
    >
    >It's difficult to delve into the structural issue without wading into the

    >Boeing vs. Airbus swamp, where any observation is instantly tainted by its
    >origin. Americans noting any Airbus structural issues (A380 early failure
    >of wing in static test; loss of vertical surfaces in Canadian fleet prior to
    >AA A300, e.g.) will be attacked by the other side as partisan, biased, etc. "
    >
    >His follow-up:
    >
    >One gets a really unique insight into structural issues when one has
    >first-hand experience in the dismantling process.
    >
    >I am an A&P, FEJ and an ATP with 7000 flight hours and I was absolutely
    >stunned, flabbergasted when I realized that the majority of internal
    >airframe structural supports on the A 310 which appear to be aluminum are actually rolled composite material with aluminum rod ends. They shattered.
    >
    >Three years ago we had a storm come through, with gusts up to 60-70 kts., catching several A320s tied down on the line, out in the open.
    >
    >The A320 elevators and rudder hinges whose actuators had been
    >removed shattered and the rudder and elevators came off.    (Is that maybe a slight exageration ?)
    >
    >Upon closer inspection I realized that not only were the rear spars
    >compos ite but so were the hinges.  While Boeing also uses composite
    >material in its airfoil structures, the actual attach fittings for
    >the elevators, rudder, vertical and horizontal stabilizers are all of machined aluminum."

[muppet]

The rudder or tailplane problem/separation issue has it's origins funnily enough with unexplained Boeing accidents particularly the B 737. Airbus first fatal accident attributed to was the one in JFK just after 911 and as the Airbus, even though a relatively old aircraft, had more information on it's FDR (flight data recorder) the investigation concluded that it was caused by pilot error after entering wake turbulence.

In addition though it was discovered that ex-US military pilots, in particular, were trained to aggressively use the rudder to recover from upsets. Commercial pilots are trained to use rudder only for engine failures and crosswinds. The aggressive use of rudder, in particular the rapid inputting of successive full opposite (left then right then left etc) rudder known as rudder reversals, will exceed the design limits of commercial aircraft.

Boeing had another issue with a rudder PCU that could freeze in certain situations but they (Boeing that is) still point at pilots exceeding the design limitation as the probable cause of at least a couple of unexplained B737 crashes.

After this finding Boeing re-analysed their unexplained crashed and concluded that the 'military training' was likely to have caused those crashes as they were flown in the States by American crews. Part of the problem is that in particular at American Airlines the military procedure was actually taught to their pilots in error.

The rudder/tailplane separation issue for both Boeing and Airbus was solved (at least until now) once the above finding was released.

Here is the NTSB recommendation letter after their report into that accident.

Specifically, the National Transportation Safety Board has learned that many pilot training programs do not include information about the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes.

Here is Airlinesafety.com analysis of the Boeing rudder problems. They have no doubt that the faulty PCU is the source of the problem but the link and the articles on it pre-date the Airbus A300 in JFK when rudder reversals by pilots were an unknown factor.

Back to the AF 447. If they had an upset which was likely reading the ACARS and as they were in a giant CB, if they applied the old aggressive military technique then the rudder or tailplane could have come off. However all commercial crews have been trained to avoid rudder in that scenario and I don't see it happening.
 
Not so much smoking gun as smoking pot I'd say.

[Capt Pat]

Powerful discussion there lads, way above my head. So it turns out the plane broke up in mid air, to my untrained eyes this means it was a bomb. What else could it have been?