Missing Plane!!

[orangeman]

Air France disaster pilots 'made errors', report says

France's BEA authority said the pilots ignored repeated stall warnings and failed to follow textbook procedures.

The investigation revealed that passengers were not given any warnings as pilots struggled to avoid the crash.

It issued 10 new safety recommendations including more training on how to fly aircraft manually, a skill that some industry critics say has been eroded by computers.

The latest BEA report found that pilots failed to discuss repeated "stall" alarms as their Airbus jet plummeted 38,000 feet and hurtled into the ocean at 200 km (125 miles) per hour.

The pilots "did not formally identify the loss of altitude" despite an alarm ringing for nearly a minute, the report said.

However, in a statement released at the same time as the BEA, Air France defended its pilots saying the altitude-loss alert system had malfunctioned.

"Nothing at this stage can allow the crew's technical competence to be blamed" for the crash, the airline said.

"The crew on duty showed professionalism and stayed committed until the end to operating the flight."

Ms Walls, a doctor and talented Irish dancer, was travelling home from a holiday with two friends from the Republic of Ireland- Aisling Butler from County Tipperary and Jane Deasy from Dublin.

The friends had graduated from Trinity College, Dublin two years before the accident.

Both Air France and the plane maker Airbus could face legal action based on the report's findings.

However, officials have insisted that the BEA's findings would not amount to an official attribution of blame for the disaster.

Black box recorders have already shown terrifying details of the moments before the crash and, in Paris, experts are still carrying out DNA tests to identify the remains of many of those killed.

[muppet]

That article is like reading about a bus driver who failed to control a skid without any mention of why the bus was in a skid or any other such details.

[armaghniac]

"The crew on duty showed professionalism and stayed committed until the end to operating the flight."

Oh that's all right then, they didn't head off home.

[playwiththewind1st]

probably not a terrible long list of better options available to them by that stage, i would have thought.

[orangeman]

A FRENCH report has found that human error contributed to the 2009 crash of an Air France flight from Rio to Paris that killed 228 people – including three Irish doctors.

A source close to the case told AFP that the judicial report – due to be presented to victims' families next week – has concluded that pilot error and malfunctioning speed sensors were responsible.


The three young Irish doctors were flying home from a holiday with friends when their plane went missing in a violent storm over the Atlantic.


The ill-fated Airbus A330 aircraft flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris in June 2009 disappeared after it ran into stormy weather with strong turbulence around four hours into the flight.


The three friends were Jane Deasy (27), from Rathgar in Dublin, Aisling Butler (26), from Roscrea, Co Tipperary, and Eithne Walls, (28), a former Irish dancing star and member of the famous 'Riverdance' troupe from Ballygowan, Co Down.


They graduated together from the same class as doctors in surgery from Trinity College on June 15, 2007.


It took days before debris from the crash was located in the remote equatorial Atlantic Ocean area, and far longer until the wreckage was recovered.


The black boxes were finally located by robot submarines after a search spanning 23 months and costing about $40m.


A second report by the French aviation safety authority, BEA, is due to present its final report on the crash on Thursday. The paper is eagerly awaited amid a row between Airbus and Air France on who ultimately bears responsibility.


The source said the separate 356-page judicial report found that speed sensors froze up and failed, but also that the "captain had failed in his duties" and "prevented the co-pilot from reacting".


The aircraft had entered a zone of turbulence two hours into the flight when the autopilot suddenly disengaged, the BEA had said earlier.


Investigators revealed last year that Captain Marc Dubois was on a break as his two less experienced co-pilots ignored and failed to discuss repeated stall warnings during the three and a half minutes it took the Airbus A330 to plunge into the ocean.


All 228 people on board – including crew – died after the Airbus hurtled into the Atlantic at a speed of 180 feet a second in the worst disaster in Air France's history.


French magistrates are investigating Air France and Airbus for alleged manslaughter in connection with the crash, notably because of the malfunctioning speed sensors, known as Pitots.


The airline replaced the Pitots, manufactured by French company Thales, on its Airbus planes with a newer model after the crash.


Victims' families have previously alleged that the involvement of big French corporations such as Airbus and Air France was influencing the affair.

[armaghniac]

I was watching a documentary about this Air France crash tonight. It seems like a bit of a clusterfuck. The least experienced pilot at the controls and he didn't seem to have a clue. I know little about flying, but from playing a computer game it is clear that if you get a stall warning at high altitude that you stop pointing the nose of the aircraft upwards, but rather descend a fraction under power. Leaving aside complex computers a spirit level would show the pitch of the aircraft, perhaps a few old fashioned devices are needed in fly by wire aircraft. They were replacing the sensors, but some training for staff would have been appropriate if these things had ever failed.

I suppose the equivalent would be if your GPS system is recommending bollix, get out the road map rather than following it.

[Milltown Row2]

A computer game?? I'm fecking brilliant at Call of duty but wouldn't have a fecking clue if it were real!

[Jeepers Creepers]

You can have all the technology in there world but if you have a half wit controlling it then you are f##ked! Watched the documentary before about the airfrance flight and the imcompetence was frightening. Umpteen opportunities to right a wrong

[muppet]

I was watching a documentary about this Air France crash tonight. It seems like a bit of a clusterfuck. The least experienced pilot at the controls and he didn't seem to have a clue. I know little about flying, but from playing a computer game it is clear that if you get a stall warning at high altitude that you stop pointing the nose of the aircraft upwards, but rather descend a fraction under power. Leaving aside complex computers a spirit level would show the pitch of the aircraft, perhaps a few old fashioned devices are needed in fly by wire aircraft. They were replacing the sensors, but some training for staff would have been appropriate if these things had ever failed.

I suppose the equivalent would be if your GPS system is recommending bollix, get out the road map rather than following it.

That is over simplifying things.

If there was only a stall warning, then any halfwit could determine that a stall recovery might help. AF447 had multiple warnings, all at the same time, while flying in a thunderstorm the size of Munster. They lost all of their instruments so it is likely they had overspeed warnings to go with the stall warnings. It seems to me that the pilot flying was fixated on the overspeed warning. Here is a list and some basic analysis of some of the warnings they got: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/87963438/Analysis-of-AF447-ACARS

As for the sprint level theory. That would work fine if the aircraft wasn't moving and generating any g forces. But in the latter case, a spirit level is unreliable. Think of why, when an aircraft banks left or right, you don't see all the drinks in the cabin spill. Granted that example is exaggerated, as it is for bank not pitch, but the point is still valid.

[armaghniac]

If there was only a stall warning, then any halfwit could determine that a stall recovery might help. AF447 had multiple warnings, all at the same time, while flying in a thunderstorm the size of Munster. They lost all of their instruments so it is likely they had overspeed warnings to go with the stall warnings. It seems to me that the pilot flying was fixated on the overspeed warning. Here is a list and some basic analysis of some of the warnings they got: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/87963438/Analysis-of-AF447-ACARS

Reading a bit more about this, it is obvious that some of these warnings were dysfunctional. For instance, the stall warning cut out after a while as the data was so far out of normal range. But when they plane levelled up to some extent the data came back into range and the stall warning resumed, although the levelling of the plane was actually going in the right direction! As perhaps some ranking of warnings is appropriate, to reduce information overload.

Both training and better information presentation is needed.

As for the sprint level theory. That would work fine if the aircraft wasn't moving and generating any g forces. But in the latter case, a spirit level is unreliable. Think of why, when an aircraft banks left or right, you don't see all the drinks in the cabin spill. Granted that example is exaggerated, as it is for bank not pitch, but the point is still valid.

Perhaps the spirit level is simplistic, but simple instruments that provide the basic data.

[DennistheMenace]

I've watched the documentary in question, I suspect we'll see a similar one for the Air Asia flight once the full report is completed next year. Ultimately it's a combination of errors which lead to these type of disasters and erradicating human error completley is impossible.

[muppet]

I've watched the documentary in question, I suspect we'll see a similar one for the Air Asia flight once the full report is completed next year. Ultimately it's a combination of errors which lead to these type of disasters and erradicating human error completley is impossible.

It is decades since passenger aircraft simply stalled to a fatal crash. Every pilot knows how to get out of a stall. But these two events appear to have presented such a complicated stream of information, so suddenly and so confusingly, that the pilots simply couldn't recognise or diagnose the problem properly. These aircraft work beautifully when everything is normal or even close to normal. But things are chaotic when a serious problem occurs.

Imagine 10 people shouting at you at the same time, with equal vigour. The human mind doesn't cope very well with that. Add a highly unusual situation whereby you are a co-pilot hand flying for the first time ever at high altitude (because the computers can't cope), in the middle of the above confusion and nowadays you have a dangerous situation, one that wasn't much of a problem 25 years ago. All aircraft manufacturers strongly recommend using autopilots for everything but takeoff and landing, and almost all airlines push the same philosophy.

That is fine, but how do you identify a pilot who might benefit from some extra training in high altitude handling and stalling and upset recognition, if he is never, ever, tested in that scenario?

It is important to note that despite the above, the vast majority of pilots have the ability to cope. Many do so without the event ever reaching the news. Others have flown older aircraft designs, which give a much better grounding of the basic of flying and you would expect them to cope easily.

But for newer pilots who have only flown the latest aircraft, it is much harder to score that injury time winner when you haven't been allowed to touch the ball for years.

[armaghniac]

Imagine 10 people shouting at you at the same time, with equal vigour

Systems need to prioritise information into must know, like to know, information only ...

But for newer pilots who have only flown the latest aircraft, it is much harder to score that injury time winner when you haven't been allowed to touch the ball for years.

In this case, the more senior of the co-pilots should have taken control immediately things began to pear shaped and the captain should have been called.

[muppet]

Imagine 10 people shouting at you at the same time, with equal vigour

Systems need to prioritise information into must know, like to know, information only ...

They are prioritised accordingly. The problem is dealing with each one while trying to make sense of everything. For example, one of the the top priority warnings is the autopilot disconnecting. The reason for that is obviously that it is vital the pilots take control in that event. Fair enough. But it takes time, under pressure, to analyse each individual warning and to take the appropriate action. But that warning will probably come after another warning (the likely primary failure) and will be immediately followed by a series of other warnings. These warning come with bells and sirens blaring and it is difficult to remain disciplined, and calm, in order to deal with the warnings in a logical and timely manner. Each message will carry information that is vitally important, but it takes an experienced head, or a very talented inexperienced one, to quickly and accurately make complete sense of it sometimes.

The AF447 had all of the warnings I mentioned in the link above, but the correct action was not anything the computer suggested. It required one of the pilots to recognise the condition as 'unreliable airspeed' and act accordingly. Even more confusing is that if they did that, the procedure recommended by Airbus recommended setting a pitch up to about 5 degrees and setting a power setting that would have also given a pitch up moment. This would most likely have led to a stall anyway.

The experienced head is needed to get around the confusion. Sullenburger, for example, dismissed the cacophony of warnings and simply glided his aircraft onto the Hudson River. Everyone survived.

But for newer pilots who have only flown the latest aircraft, it is much harder to score that injury time winner when you haven't been allowed to touch the ball for years.

In this case, the more senior of the co-pilots should have taken control immediately things began to pear shaped and the captain should have been called.

This follows on nicely to my next point. Airlines and regulators allow longer flights to be crewed with a scenario whereby, when a captain has to take a break, there will be 'only' two co-pilots in the cockpit. This is merely a finance issue. Carrying an extra co-pilot is a lot cheaper than carrying an extra captain. It is likely, but by no means certain, that having an experienced captain in the cockpit would have increased the chances of AF447 surviving. I'd go as far as saying there wouldn't have been a crash, but that is speculation. But there is no clamour from anywhere to insist that the cockpit always has a captain in it.

No aircraft can fly without a captain who holds a valid license, yet regulators allow the flight to continue for long periods without a captain at the controls.

Also many airlines put the pilots rest area at or near the back of the aircraft. Some even put it in a hold. Imagine trying to get the captain, on whose license the aircraft is flying, from a hold at the back of the plane, to the cockpit in a stalling aircraft being thrown around in a thunderstorm. Again this is down purely to cost. They could easily design a suitable rest area at the back of the cockpit.

[muppet]

And another one, the pilots appear to have dealt with it well though: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558483-iced-aoa-sensors-send-a321-into-deep-dive.html

This looks like iced up probes fooled the autopilot into thinking it was stalling. The computers took over and incorrectly put the aircraft into a descent. The pilots recognised that was not the right course of action and 'turned off the computers'. In reality it means the pilots shut down enough navigational systems (e.g. 2 out of three ADIRUs) to force the aircraft computers to hand over control to the pilots.

Yes, it is as crazy as it sounds.