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It reminds me of the Field starring Roscommon as the Bull McCave and Galway as a Dan in a fancy new car.

The Bull McCabe would be Mayo.
This fella is Roscommon.

The field would be Sam
The widow would be the Dubs

Sean Moran  is a very good analyst of the Mayo psyche 

http://www.irishtimes.com/sport/holy-grail-tantalisingly-close-for-mayo-again-1.533750

"I can take the despair. It's the hope I can't stand,"
– John Cleese (from the film Clockwise)

THE ESSENTIAL poignancy of Mayo was best expressed to me by a native, who proudly (and a little tongue-in-cheek – I think) proclaimed his county as "the second biggest in Ireland – when the tide's out".
Nowhere is the studied dejection and Zen fatalism as evident as in the county's football fortunes: "Mayo, God help us. Where have all the minors gone? Washte of time (I'm going home to burn this)," and all the other expressions of forebodings, all too predictably realised."

They are still in the competition. That is all that matters for the moment.

Great stuff there blast05. It was only yesterday i read an  interview by balls.ie done with JOM and he said how they thrashed it out with players about tactics after roscommon defeat . Sounded very much like the players had their say too.found it very interesting how he then gave the squad 10 days off as the qualifier wasnt for 3 weeks, no contact at all for ten days.

there was no social media chatter in 2001 when Galway did the qualifier tour. The players just got on with things.
Mayo always have the vulnerability that the nihilism of the fans gets into the minds of the players. Galway hurlers have a similar problem. Both teams should have won an all Ireland in the last decade.   

Oh baby baby

Shane Curran the ex Ros goalie has announced he will be going to Salthill for the match. Huge interest on youtube

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vWaRiD5ym74

Syf is predicted to go f**king crazy especially if the FDs win

The tactical battle will be interesting. Ros had a better league but Galway have better form.

Social mobility is freer than in other countries. There is still room for improvement.

The political system in the US can't cope with the fallout from the economic situation. The Founders devised a King less system of checks and balances to avoid the system coming under the control of a corrupt elite but the wealth of the wealthiest is off the scale now. Political polarisation has been the norm for a few years and reduces the chances of chronic issues such as healthcare or climate  being dealt with coherently. The Clinton email thing is one example of what the other side do with an issue. American failure is something to get used to.

Nordies all have the right to Irish citizenship so Brexit wouldn't necessarily have to apply to the 6 counties as long as London keeps the credit card working.

It reminds me of the Field starring Roscommon as the Bull McCave and Galway as a Dan in a fancy new car.

No Shines?

They are  having the ould  lobby washed down. The bus is due in.

Leadsom vs May

Leadsom is dangerous. She would be closer to trump than to anyone civilised

What are you basing that on ?

What Private Eye say about her. She is rabidly neoliberal

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dabbd16a-445b-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1.html

July 7, 2016 6:32 pm

Chilcot report lists British humiliations in Iraq
Henry Mance and Andrew England

When Sir Hilary Synnott took charge of southern Iraq in June 2003, the Foreign Office instructed him to send back "at least a report a day".
Unfortunately, they did not equip him with a phone or a computer.

This was one of many occasions when British officials realised that the challenges of occupying Iraq after the joint invasion with the US had been severely underestimated by their bosses in London.

The Chilcot report, published on Wednesday, lays bare how UK forces tried to bring peace and democracy to southern Iraq before withdrawing after eight years and still "a very long way from success".
Among the final humiliations was a secret truce with the Mahdi Army, a Shia militia responsible for killing several British soldiers. Sir Hilary ended up borrowing a computer from American officials and setting up a Yahoo account to send his confidential reports.
Other problems proved less tractable. Douglas Brand, a police adviser in 2003-04, described plans to create an Iraqi police force as "ridiculous".
"We recruit 30,000 in 30 days, call them police, label them police, give them weapons and say, 'you are now in the police'," he recalled thinking.
For Major General Andrew Stewart, a military commander, the moment when he realised hopes were running ahead of reality came when he was speaking to a washing-machine salesman in a souk.
"He was selling 20 a day . . . we were never going to meet that expectation [for electricity, water and sewage treatment]. That is something that we never really came to terms with."
The most chilling cause for reassessment was the violence. In late 2003, the mainly Shia area of south-east Iraq, controlled by British forces, was viewed as "relatively calm" by the Joint Intelligence Committee.
Then on April 6 2004, there were 35 shooting incidents and attacks in Basra before 7.30am, and the city of Nasiriyah was taken over by the Mahdi Army. "It was like a switch had been flicked," recalled Maj Gen Stewart. "I think it was then that we realised the scale of the task ahead of us," said Sir John Sawers, a senior civil servant.

Isis Inc: how oil fuels the jihadi terrorists


Jihadis' oil operation forces even their enemies to trade with them
Belatedly acknowledging the problem was one thing, addressing it was another. The Chilcot report does not just criticise the lack of prewar planning.
After the invasion there were strategies without practical steps, a lack of commitment from Whitehall departments and a need for a cabinet minister with overall responsibility for Iraq.
Britain also lacked influence over key decisions taken by the US, such as the de-Ba'athification of the civil service and the disbanding of the army.
Iraqis wanted jobs, water, electricity and security. But in Whitehall a "circular analysis began to develop in which progress on reconstruction required security to be improved, and improved security required the consent generated by reconstruction activity," the Chilcot report said. Tony Blair, whose decision to go to war was much criticised by the report, is judged to have correctly tried to focus attention on security.
Iraq was the first time since the second world war that the UK had taken part in an opposed invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign state, and the inexperience showed. Iraq needed 7,000 police trainers; it took the UK five months to muster 100. Military chiefs exacerbated problems by lobbying for the UK to shift troops to Afghanistan, where they saw greater prospects of success.
In 2006, the UK was reducing its troop numbers, even though basic services were not being delivered in Basra and the department of international development had withdrawn from the city. A spiral of kidnappings, murder and intimidation took hold.
By the spring of 2007, after a constant barrage of deadly attacks, UK officials began making contact with the Mahdi Army, the militia that had been fighting troops and was nominally loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shia cleric. The talks eventually led to a deal under which the Mahdi Army agreed to allow British forces safe passage to withdraw from Basra Palace — which had been their base to the city — to the airport outside of Basra.

In return, the British agreed to release a number of Mahdi Army detainees, while effectively handing the key southern port over to Shia militias in the absence of an effective Iraqi government force. Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, Britain's senior military representative in Iraq, warned that it would be seen as "a hollow victory, gained for fixed British rather than strategic interests," according to Chilcot.

The report described the deal as "humiliating", saying Britain should have been able to increase troop levels. Attacks against the coalition forces reduced because they were no longer in the city. But the violence and intimidation against Basra residents increased. Businessmen were kidnapped, intellectuals fled and women were murdered for dressing or behaving in a way the militia deemed immoral.

A semblance of stability finally returned to Basra after the Charge of the Knights, a 2008 Iraqi military operation backed by US air and ground forces. The operation came as a "surprise" to British forces, the Chilcot report found — indicating just how secondary their contribution had become.

Britain in Basra

April 2003 British troops enter Basra and prove unable to prevent outbreak of looting.
October 2003 The Joint Intelligence Committee says situation in the area is "relatively calm".
April 2004 Spike in attacks by Mahdi Army militia on British forces. Publication of Abu Ghraib photos.
May 2006 UK becomes responsible for Helmand province, Afghanistan, reducing resources for Iraq. Separately, Iraq declares state of emergency in Basra following violence.
August 2007 Deal with Mahdi Army reduces attacks on UK forces in Basra
March 2008 Charge of the Knights operation, led by Iraqi government, pushes Mahdi Army back.
April 2009 Britain ends combat operations in Iraq.

Payet for me

Leadsom vs May

Leadsom is dangerous. She would be closer to trump than to anyone civilised

[Mayo would beat either of the Ulster finalists]

Monaghan have one forward.
Cork are not good enough
Mayo would beat either of the Ulster finalists

Galway beat Mayo so not sure about that. Would Galway beat Monaghan or even Cavan?

Mayo underestimated Galway.
Galway would beat Cavan and would probably score more than Monaghan would