Collins or De Valera

[Main Street]

There is no doubt that the Rising was an absolute shambles typifying historical Irish rebellions before that, and EG is correct when he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit if rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders. The British always seemed to make such errors, that bullish retribution and flexing of muscle has been their downfall in almost every patch of land they encroached upon.'

.

Very pretty, but historically that's a weak theory of the 1916 rebellion, that bit about the  "re-awakening of the spirit" being an incidental by-product of the rising, a result of a British mistake.
It is a historical revision to ignore that part of the planning on the eve of the rebellion, which in the now certainty of military defeat, anticipated that  "bullish retribution"  being a factor for future gain, as the hope.

"In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called".
Documentary evidence from the leaders, in the midst of the set backs in the build up to eve of the rebellion, gives a very acute awareness of what would happen to both themselves and public opinion afterwards. They proceeded with that foresight and factored those two events as consequence of their (military shambles) actions.
A young Tom Barry in a distant land gives a revealing account of the impact of the news of the rebellion on his psyche.

[ONeill]

There is no doubt that the Rising was an absolute shambles typifying historical Irish rebellions before that, and EG is correct when he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit if rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders. The British always seemed to make such errors, that bullish retribution and flexing of muscle has been their downfall in almost every patch of land they encroached upon.'

.

Very pretty, but historically that's a weak theory of the 1916 rebellion, that bit about the  "re-awakening of the spirit" being an incidental by-product of the rising, a result of a British mistake.
It is a historical revision to ignore that part of the planning on the eve of the rebellion, which in the now certainty of military defeat, anticipated that  "bullish retribution"  being a factor for future gain, as the hope.

"In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called".
Documentary evidence from the leaders, in the midst of the set backs in the build up to eve of the rebellion, gives a very acute awareness of what would happen to both themselves and public opinion afterwards. They proceeded with that foresight and factored those two events as consequence of their (military shambles) actions.
A young Tom Barry in a distant land gives a revealing account of the impact of the news of the rebellion on his psyche.

I don't really understand what you are trying to say - you seem to be agreeing with me. The actual GPO incident was shambolic but ultimately fruitful due to the British response. I don't really understand what you mean by 'incidental'.

[Main Street]

There is no doubt that the Rising was an absolute shambles typifying historical Irish rebellions before that, and EG is correct when he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit if rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders. The British always seemed to make such errors, that bullish retribution and flexing of muscle has been their downfall in almost every patch of land they encroached upon.'

.

Very pretty, but historically that's a weak theory of the 1916 rebellion, that bit about the  "re-awakening of the spirit" being an incidental by-product of the rising, a result of a British mistake.
It is a historical revision to ignore that part of the planning on the eve of the rebellion, which in the now certainty of military defeat, anticipated that  "bullish retribution"  being a factor for future gain, as the hope.

"In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called".
Documentary evidence from the leaders, in the midst of the set backs in the build up to eve of the rebellion, gives a very acute awareness of what would happen to both themselves and public opinion afterwards. They proceeded with that foresight and factored those two events as consequence of their (military shambles) actions.
A young Tom Barry in a distant land gives a revealing account of the impact of the news of the rebellion on his psyche.

I don't really understand what you are trying to say - you seem to be agreeing with me. The actual GPO incident was shambolic but ultimately fruitful due to the British response. I don't really understand what you mean by 'incidental'.

You agreed with EG.
"he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit if rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders".

I understand that  to be saying that the awakening of Irish nationalism post 1916 was caused by an event that was not part of the rebellion plan.
That it was caused by a British tactical blunder. That the 1916 rebellion was a brainless blunder.

I disagree, historical documentation overwhelmingly supports that when the planned sizable rebellion was down to bare bones the
rebel IRB leaders were quite aware that they were signing their death warrant and knew that their actions would provoke this retaliatory response from the British and that in the Rebel minds this was a necessary sacrifice on their part. The Brits took the bait.
Whether you agree or not with that strategy is besides the point. The facts are that this was their strategy.

[ONeill]

There is no doubt that the Rising was an absolute shambles typifying historical Irish rebellions before that, and EG is correct when he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit if rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders. The British always seemed to make such errors, that bullish retribution and flexing of muscle has been their downfall in almost every patch of land they encroached upon.'

.

Very pretty, but historically that's a weak theory of the 1916 rebellion, that bit about the  "re-awakening of the spirit" being an incidental by-product of the rising, a result of a British mistake.
It is a historical revision to ignore that part of the planning on the eve of the rebellion, which in the now certainty of military defeat, anticipated that  "bullish retribution"  being a factor for future gain, as the hope.

"In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called".
Documentary evidence from the leaders, in the midst of the set backs in the build up to eve of the rebellion, gives a very acute awareness of what would happen to both themselves and public opinion afterwards. They proceeded with that foresight and factored those two events as consequence of their (military shambles) actions.
A young Tom Barry in a distant land gives a revealing account of the impact of the news of the rebellion on his psyche.

I don't really understand what you are trying to say - you seem to be agreeing with me. The actual GPO incident was shambolic but ultimately fruitful due to the British response. I don't really understand what you mean by 'incidental'.

You agreed with EG.
"he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit if rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders".

I understand that  to be saying that the awakening of Irish nationalism post 1916 was caused by an event that was not part of the rebellion plan.
That it was caused by a British tactical blunder. That the 1916 rebellion was a brainless blunder.

I disagree, historical documentation overwhelmingly supports that when the planned sizable rebellion was down to bare bones the
rebel IRB leaders were quite aware that they were signing their death warrant and knew that their actions would provoke this retaliatory response from the British and that in the Rebel minds this was a necessary sacrifice on their part. The Brits took the bait.
Whether you agree or not with that strategy is besides the point. The facts are that this was their strategy.

I disagree, MS. I think up until a few weeks before the Rising, the leaders had reasonable expectations of overthrowing the British. You only have to listen to the archives of those involved in the Ulster side of events to realise how close the rising was to becoming a massive effort. A series of unfortunate events ruined plans including the Aud episode and the countermanding and confusing McNeill orders in the North. Risings in Cork and Limerick were thwarted before they could begin. The GPO contingent and those in the surrounding area were hopeful of a swelling of numbers as word was passed on. I find the 'romantic blood sacrifice' lazy and spoon-fed, and actually insults and devalues the roles and atrributes of those involved. 

[TacadoirArdMhacha]

Great song - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AK1HosFCAE

The treaty should never have been signed and no one should ever have died for the difference between it and what we ended up with.

[Main Street]

I disagree, MS. I think up until a few weeks before the Rising, the leaders had reasonable expectations of overthrowing the British.

You only have to listen to the archives of those involved in the Ulster side of events to realise how close the rising was to becoming a massive effort.

That's fair enough, I Agree, but a lot happened in those last 2 weeks.
The focus here is on the days before the rising.
The decision to go ahead was made by the leadership and morale cannot be kept high in the absence of hope.
The rising was planned by the IRB, namely Mac Diarmada and Clarke, they were quite aware that 95% of their plans were in bits.
What is of concern here is the decision to go ahead with that knowledge.

The GPO contingent and those in the surrounding area were hopeful of a swelling of numbers as word was passed on

.

What do you think, that a commander can lead his soldiers into battle without giving them hope?
What do you consider would the morale be if Connolly the night before the rising had said, we are fecked, truly fecked but do your best lads.

I find the 'romantic blood sacrifice' lazy and spoon-fed, and actually insults and devalues the roles and atrributes of those involved. 

You need to get a perspective on why rock hard practical rebels like Clarke and Mac Diarmada, who did most of the planning, would proceed in the knowledge that most of their military plans were already dust.
Or why Connolly would have gone ahead alone with the ICA.
The perspective is gained by examining their ideology, their word and their actions in the context of that time.

[Evil Genius]

After all, not only was Lloyd George no Englishman, but English wasn't even his first language.

Still, how would a Welshman understand what it's like to live under the yoke of an oppressive neighbour...

An Uncle Tom if I ever saw one.

An Uncle Tom, then is it?  Let me see.
The original Uncle Tom, a slave's son who lived in a cabin, was the long-suffering servant of the White Folk who lived in the Big House, yet he was always loyal and never resentful.

Meanwhile, Lloyd George was born in relatively humble circumstances, being brought up by his extended family in rural Wales after his father died. Despite his coming from a strongly non-Conformist background, and speaking Welsh as his first language, he gained a good eduction as a Scholarship boy, before qualifying as a Lawyer. From there he pursued a career in politics.
By the time of his death, highlights of his 55 years as an MP include being President of the Board of Trade, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Minister of Munitions, War Secretary, Prime Minister (6 years), Liberal Party Leader and "Father of the House". He was also Rector of the University of Edinburgh, a Privy Councillor, and a holder of the Order of Merit. Oh and he was created 1st. Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor.

I must say it hadn't really occurred to me, but the similarities between him and Uncle Tom are uncanny. You learn something every day...

while your on here, who do you reckon will win Sam or McCarthy?  

Er, the Dallas Cowboys?  

[Evil Genius]

There is no doubt that the Rising was an absolute shambles, typifying historical Irish rebellions before that, and EG is correct when he said their intended re-awakening of the spirit of rebellion in the general public only occurred when the British, having not learned from the historical blunders, decided to execute the leaders. The British always seemed to make such errors, that bullish retribution and flexing of muscle has been their downfall in almost every patch of land they encroached upon.

This item (in bold) caused me to consider this aspect of British Imperialism and at the risk of taking this thread way off topic, I'd actually take issue with it. It is undoubtedly true that the British experience of Empire is littered with such incidents. Nonetheless, there is no way a relatively small archipelago on the edge of a Continent, without a particularly large population, could ever have conquered, never mind held for over 200 years, an Empire larger than any seen before (or since?) if they were "always making such errors".

In truth, they must for the most part have got more things right than wrong when administering their territories. Plus the fact that the UK itself has never been invaded in nearly 1,000 years and hasn't suffered Revolution or Civil War (Ireland excepted, perhaps) in hundreds of years is actually a testiment to the country's stability, including its abillity to avoid  frequent catastrophic errors of Government and War. (Btw, in saying this, I am not expressing any opinion on the morality or otherwise of Imperialism).

Perhaps the most notable example is to be found in India. Certainly, they were caught by surprise by the Mutiny of 1857, and their response then was of a brutality that made Easter 1916 seem remarkably restrained by comparison. Nonetheless, India was still to remain a Colony for almost another 100 years before the British lowered the flag.

And, taking us back to the subject of Ireland, surely the manner of their retreat from India in 1947 offers an insight as to what might have been in Ireland, less than 30 years earlier? There can be little doubt that the astonishing contribution of Indian soldiers, sailors and airmen during WWII was a major contributory factor in the UK moving from (begrudgingly) offering limited autonomy to India as late as 1942, to full independence 5 years later.
At the start of the war, the (British) Indian Army was just over 200,000 strong (remarkably small to control such a huge country). By the end of the war, over 2 1/2 million men had joined and fought - the greatest volunteer army the world has ever seen. By contrast, Chandra Bose's Indian National Army, which fought on the Axis forces side on the basis that "My enemy's enemy is my friend", never achieved anything like the same popular support.
Mind you, many of the INA leaders were executed after the War and they, too, have been subject to a more kindly revision to the record of their place in their country's history, despite their perceived abject failure at the time*.

Anyhow, for all the wrongs and outrages committed by the British in India down the centuries, the fact that the Indians still remained essentially loyal at Britain's hour of need, undoubtedly influenced the latter in eventually "doing the right thing" in granting a subject people thier much longer-for freedom. The lesson for Ireland seems to me to be fairly obvious - though as an Irish Unionist, perhaps I should be glad  that the Rebels of 1916 struck when they did, thereby screwing up what may have been the best chance in hundreds of years of persuading Great Britain to disengage from the whole of Ireland...


* - Now where have I heard this before? 

[highorlow]

Did anyone here watch the great british school swap last night?